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new order. To a considerable extent the same may be said of the 1980 act.

We should have faith that there are political leaders in both the executive and legislative branches who understand the importance of first-rate diplomacy to the practice of peace and view it as the only viable alternative for advancing and protecting our vital national interests. These men also realize that our present capabilities leave much to be desired but, like our new secretary of state, they wait for the professionals to summon the courage and the creativity to enlighten and inspire the political leadership to move in the right direction.

Individually Foreign Service officers are highly talented, creative and ambitious but as a group many critics see us as timid, clubby, and resistant to change. We must alter this image by speaking out without fear or favor. We must no longer accept like sheep the rhetorical hypocrisy of presidents and secretaries of states who praise the Foreign Service for its dedication, talent and loyalty, but are too preoccupied with other matters to provide the tangible support we must have to be truly effective.

Too often our political leaders shy away from confrontation on our behalf with the Office of Management and Budget or congressional appropriations committees. Too often they appoint amateurs or even incompetents to positions of high diplomatic sensitivity and responsibility. We must persuade them that their political support for a modest but consistent investment in professional diplomacy will pay off in terms of national security.

To the extent that first-rate diplomacy can reduce tensions and help create an orderly world environment, we can scale down costly arms races and achieve many other savings which improve our domestic economy and contribute to the peace and prosperity of America and the world.

Those who are skeptical about the efficacy of a strong and skillful diplomacy should remember the examples of the Austrian peace treaty, the resolution of the Trieste dispute and, more recently and dramatically, the avoidance of a disastrous racial war in the heart of Africa brought about by the settlement in Rhodesia. Many more examples come to mind.

What we should ask for, then, in this "call to arms" is the means to create a new Foreign Service: creative, cohesive, highly professionalized and disciplined and able to assume leadership in the nation's foreign affairs. The nation wants and needs a Foreign Service that political leaders can sincerely admire and respect and on whose judgment and specialized skills they can draw with complete confidence.

We want American diplomacy to have a rebirth. We want its leadership and influence felt throughout the world so that tensions gradually relax and complex problems begin to dissolve. We want to help create a world that turns from conflict to human betterment, with America leading and sharing in the general revival. We want an international environment in which the arts flourish, taxes wane, economic activity, technological innovation and human talent turn from unproductive arms races to the generation of real wealth so that social and ecological problems as well as political and economic inequities can be attacked with realistic vigor and adequate resources.

All this may seem utopian and starry-eyed to some but it is the stuff of human progress. So let us not fear to proclaim our abiding belief that a potent and effective diplomacy can make a major contribution to the creation of an era of world prosperity and peace.○

## KNOW THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

○ MR. EAGLETON. Mr. President, a number of months ago, a publication entitled "Know the District of Columbia" was sent to my Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia. The booklet, which was researched, written, and published by the District of Columbia League of Women Voters, has proved so valuable to my subcommittee that I would be doing a disservice not to bring it to the attention of my colleagues. It should be added to all Senate reception shelves for reference.

What makes this particular publication unique is its focus on Washington as a city—not the Federal enclave. Washington, like all metropolitan areas, has schools, recreational facilities, public libraries, hospitals, and neighborhoods, although many of us who work on Capitol Hill know only the city's monumental core.

The D.C. League now acquaints us in 125 well-written and finely illustrated pages with life in the city—neighborhoods, economic life, recreation, cultural resources, and the media—the history of the District, the governmental structure of the District, services available to citizens, voter information, and the role of the District in the wider metropolitan area. The publication also includes easy-to-read charts and a comprehensive index.

In my years as chairman of the District of Columbia Subcommittee, this is the finest description of the District I have seen, and I think my colleagues would find that almost any constituent question about the District can be answered with this one publication. Orders can be placed with the D.C. League. Prices range from \$2.50 to \$4 per copy, depending on the size of the order.

The District League performed yeoman's service by producing this publication and deserves both our thanks and financial support through purchases.

Mr. President, I also include for my colleague's attention an editorial from the Washington Post which further attests to the League's accomplishment.

The editorial is as follows:

## LET THE LEAGUE BE YOUR GUIDE

This is an undisguised plug for one of the best publications we've seen on the District of Columbia—its history, its complicated system of government, things to do here and answers to those questions people are always too embarrassed to ask because they think everybody else already knows. It's a bargain booklet (\$2.50 to \$4 a copy, depending on the order) just published by the D.C. League of Women Voters. Not only is it an impressive research effort, but the handbook—"Know the District of Columbia"—is a graphically attractive and clearly written compendium, organized for ready reference.

With objectivity and up-to-date information, the book begins with a fact-filled portrait of the city—who lives here, what they do and what kinds of neighborhoods they live in and how various development efforts are affecting the economy. On one page, there is an at-a-glance box of "historical highlights" that begins in 1787, with Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution—that's the one providing for a seat of government and "exclu-

sive" legislative powers of Congress over the District—and goes to the election of Mayor Barry and Council Chairman Arrington Dixon in 1978.

One of the most valuable chapters is an explanation of how the congressional/local relationships work, how they evolved, how the budget is put together and enacted and how bills become law. Other run-downs include guides to the courts, the advisory neighborhood commissions, public schools, Metro, voted information and regional organizations.

We're told that many local businesses and civic organizations are already starting to snap up copies. They should. So should the city schools, where the store of local history and information on the classroom shelves has always been woefully thin.○

## THE ISSUE OF BENEFITS FOR FORMER SPOUSES UNDER THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT OF 1980

○ Mr. PELL. Mr. President, on October 1, 1980, Representative PAT SCHROEDER inserted into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD (page H10233) a statement concerning the Foreign Service Act's provisions relating to the pension rights of the divorced spouses of Foreign Service officers.

In her statement, Mrs. SCHROEDER maintains that the conference report permits a court to reopen divorce settlements reached prior to the effective date of the act, "if the situation warrants." (Page H10235.)

Her position is not consistent with the joint explanation statement of the committee of conference, which states:

The conference substitute adopts the Senate amendment with three modifications. First, the effective date provision (section 2403 (e) (2)) is revised to provide that the provisions relating to the rights of former spouses to receive survivor annuities shall apply only in the case of individuals who become former spouses after the effective date of the bill (February 15, 1981) . . .

The clarity of this joint explanatory statement is heightened by the transcript of the conference itself. Representative FORB objected to the Senate bill's retroactive application of the new pension provisions on grounds that they disturbed vested property rights of Foreign Service officers. The Senate conferees then proposed, as a compromise, that the new provisions be effective only "prospectively," a proposal that was quickly agreed to. The precise meaning of "prospective" became an issue, however, and led to the following colloquy:

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, couldn't the definition of "prospective" be defined as divorced in the future?

Representative SCHROEDER. "That is what I would define it as, so you don't go back."

The House conferees eventually voted on a motion to recede to the Senate with an amendment to prohibit the retroactive award of the new pension and survivor's benefits, which carried 6-5. After the vote, Chairman FASCELL asked the conferees to restate their understanding of the new amendment:

Ms. SCHLUNOR. "The staff has only two questions."

STAFF. "Does any former spouse now incur any right under this?"

Chairman FASCELL. "The Senate says no. Does that answer your question?"

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expect. Most Foreign Service reporting is narrative and topical. Some of it may be interesting but journalists can do a better and faster job and as a basis for making policy it is of little use. Accurate analysis and trend forecasting, on the other hand, must be the basis for wise policy and (more importantly) for preventive diplomacy.

b. Negotiation. This is a principal diplomatic activity whether of the junior consular officer dickering to spring an American from the local jail or of an ambassador at an international conference. It is also a core skill required for conflict management and prevention. It should not be left to on-the-job training. There is a vast body of knowledge on the subject and the fledgling diplomat must master it in a rapid and organized manner.

c. Cross-cultural Operations. This skill is what distinguishes diplomats from lawyers or labor relations counselors. The diplomat must bridge his own and a foreign culture, acting as "interpreter" from one to the other. It is a vital element in discharging his representational duties effectively. He may have to operate in several foreign cultures during his career. Cross-cultural communication and persuasion is therefore essential. Techniques for penetrating, absorbing and understanding foreign value systems have been highly developed by anthropologists and other social scientists. The junior diplomat must learn these before he is turned out to operate in an alien environment.

d. Program Management. Modern diplomacy increasingly requires skills in executive decision-making, systems analysis and similar capabilities required for the direction of multi-agency programs. An understanding of, and ability to apply, development assistance philosophies and complex inter-relationships among economic, political, military, and informational programs is essential to the modern diplomat. In addition he must be taught to operate in the complex cross-currents of Washington's political and bureaucratic maelstrom.

e. Political Maneuver and Persuasion. Both at home and abroad the diplomat must quickly identify the political pressure points of a society and how to move the political levers which make things happen. Politics is the essence of diplomacy and diplomats must be action oriented: action in the cause of freedom, order, social justice, national security and peace.

4. The administration of such sophisticated instruction and subsequent graduate-level courses at various stages of a Foreign Service career requires the transformation of the Foreign Service Institute into a Graduate Foreign Service Academy of such high quality that it will attract to its faculty the finest academic and diplomatic minds.

5. In such an academy mid-career and language and area training should be expanded by a combination of in-house and external instruction. In addition specialists should be developed in such subjects as international economics, international law, environmental and scientific global problems and many others. For example, how many Foreign Service officers know anything about Islamic law? Yet some understanding of this subject is as important for the vice consul as for the ambassador operating in the vast Islamic world we have recently "discovered."

6. The entire process of recruitment and selection for the Foreign Service we have to be revised in order to produce suitable candidates for this new kind of diplomatic professional training.

a. New entrance examinations will have to be devised to test aptitudes for the diplomatic profession as defined above.

b. All junior candidates will enter the career service only through competitive examination. To equalize the opportunity for

disadvantaged minorities an extensive internship program consisting of special courses at the Graduate Foreign Service Academy combined with work-training assignments will prepare them for the examination. When they are ready they can take the examinations with no preferential treatment along with all other candidates. This will preserve equality, dignity and effectiveness. The aim is to take in *only the best*, not to achieve some theoretical "representative" level. A winning athletic team is not produced by forcing on it artificial "representativeness" and a winning diplomatic team, which is far more important to our national security, should not be assembled on such a basis either. Equalization of opportunity should be provided *before* the entry selection process and not as part of it. In this way all accepted candidates can be confident that their success is based on merit and ability, not on artificial preference.

c. The entrance examination must be followed by the rigorous junior officer training course outlined above. New entrants would be on probationary trainee status during this period and under strict observation for academic achievement and for personality traits germane to diplomacy. Failure to qualify would result in separation at this stage. This is in line with the practice in corporate, military officer candidate and FBI trainee programs.

7. Of prime importance to this plan will be steps to revitalize morale and revivify *esprit de corps* in the Foreign Service. Because of long neglect and usurpation of diplomatic functions by the White House and Congress, the Foreign Service has slipped into a "failure mode." This must be reversed by recapturing its integrity and identity through the professionalization programs contemplated in this plan. If we want to be recognized and respected as professionals we must qualify and act as pros. We must de-emphasize demands for creature comforts. We must restore our service self-discipline and our pride in superior work under adverse personal conditions. We must again be willing, indeed enthusiastic, about tackling hardship assignments. We must recapture the élan of the 1960's Foreign Service pioneers in new African posts. If we achieve a status of respect and admiration and at the same time stand firm in our demands for the resources to serve our nation, not ourselves, the personal benefits and material rewards will follow as a matter of course.

8. To enhance Foreign Service morale we must persuade our political leaders to limit lateral entry to the absolute minimum so that promotion to higher levels remains unencumbered. The aim is to restore a proper pyramidal shape to our corps eliminating the mid-career bulges which stagnate upward mobility. Promotion must be based solely on merit and lateral entry should take place, if at all, only where it is clearly demonstrated that the necessary skills cannot be found in the ranks of career employees.

For this purpose a personal data processing system, which makes instantly available exact information concerning the skills and abilities of employees, must be provided. Ambassadorial appointments outside the career service will be made only in those rare instances where the appointee will contribute superior talents and add to the total resources of expert diplomacy, not to bestow political favor or to court powerful domestic political groups.

Diplomacy is too critical to the survival of our country to dilute it with cronyism or remnants of the spoils system. Those few who are appointed outside the career service will be chosen for their demonstrated experience in foreign affairs and knowledge of the skills of diplomacy and cultures of other countries. No career diplomat should be expected to serve under an ambassador whose diplomatic

capabilities he does not respect. In cases of extreme ambassadorial incompetence career officers should simply refuse to serve under such a chief of mission and the Association should strongly support such action of last resort.

9. The expansion and strengthening of the Foreign Service will enable the State Department to staff new posts in critical areas of the world. In particular we must reopen many consulates which were closed during periods of false economy. Consular posts are a seriously underrated asset. Closure of such posts as Meshed, the principal Shiite religious pilgrimage center of Iran, have left us with intelligence blind spots in critical areas and have deprived us of valuable political, economic and cultural contacts. Our embassies, located in capitals, are often isolated from the countryside and from business centers where important developments can originate. Well-placed consulates can alert us, at a stage when preventive diplomacy is most effective, to brewing crises which escape the notice of the tumultuous capitals.

10. The entire logistical and communications capability of the department and our foreign posts will have to be overhauled. The communications network available for diplomatic action in a crisis should be at least as good and secure as that of the Strategic Air Command. It too can save lives and protect national security. By the same token the principal officer at major posts should have an airplane under his personal control (distinct from the attaché plane) for essential travel and emergencies.

11. To supervise the implementation of this plan, the president would appoint a permanent under secretary for administration. This should be a career diplomat with both overseas and wide management experience. He would serve as the general manager of the department and not be subject to rotation thus bringing to his task an element of continuity, the lack of which has foredoomed previous reform efforts.

12. To put this plan into operation will cost money and will take time. The Department of State has not been permitted to present a realistic budget request for the past 30 years, if by realistic we understand a budget which would provide levels of personnel, training and logistical support commensurate with the vastly expanded responsibilities of American diplomacy during this period. Therefore an essential part of this plan requires a straightforward and vigorous budget presentation to the secretary, the president and the congressional leadership. Such a démarche must mince no words. Do we want to create excellence in our diplomacy? If we do then we must pay for it. The costs need not be great in comparison with other national security expenditures. Indeed marginal increases applied over a period of time in the right proportions and in the right places would pay handsome dividends. Certain countervailing economies would result. For example a more highly professionalized personnel would be more self-disciplined and self-reliant enabling a shift of manpower from overstuffed administrative overhead to substantive functions. It will take time to reverse the long period of neglect and decline. But we now have a secretary leading the department who, once convinced, can make a historic contribution by laying the foundation for the finest diplomatic service in the world.

Does this plan seem too idealistic—too far removed from the political bureaucratic realities of the day? Only by aspiring for that which is beyond ourselves can we expand the horizons of possibility. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 seemed idealistic and unattainable for a long time, yet it came to pass because of the vision, the untiring effort and the creative boldness of dedicated professionals who were not afraid to dream of a

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STAFF. "Yes, sir."

Representative SCHROEDER. "And we want to be sure that it is an agreement at the time of divorce. The other question I have is whether previously divorced people can go back for survivor's benefits, not retirement."

Representative FORD. "The answer we just got was, if you are a previous spouse at this time you are not covered."

Chairman FASCELL. "We have one more question."

Representative FORD. "Is there disagreement?"

Senator TSONGAS. "No."

The only exception to the prohibition against retroactivity was that contained in Representative BUCHANAN's later amendment, which allowed a Foreign Service Officer voluntarily to provide a survivor's benefit to a previously divorced spouse, but which did not give any right to such a benefit to former spouses, nor even any right or power to reopen previous divorce settlements.

There is no basis, as I see it, for Representative SCHROEDER's statement in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD that, as to spouses divorced prior to the Act—

Obviously, if a participant can elect to provide such benefits, a court, if the situation warrants, can order a participant to elect to provide survivor benefits.

Representative SCHROEDER's statement cannot be reconciled with Representative BUCHANAN's own statement of the purpose of his amendment, which he described as an aid to voluntary action on the part of Foreign Service officers:

And in essence, that simply provides for a present, I think, inequity in the law, that you can't do anything for a former spouse if you desire to do so. If at the time of retirement she is not then your wife, you cannot provide for him or her if you want to.

The intent—it simply permits people that the foreign service officer might desire to cover, but under present law cannot be.

Finally the Buchanan amendment itself does not contain any language that could be construed to authorize a court even to entertain a petition by a former spouse to reopen a divorce settlement or to adjust the pension rights of parties divorced before the effective date of the act.

Mrs. SCHROEDER's October 1 statement mistakes another important aspect of the conferees' intentions in adopting the conference report on the Foreign Service Act. Mrs. SCHROEDER describes the Foreign Service Act's pension provisions as "precedent setting." (Page H10236)

During the conference, Representative FORD objected to the Senate position on the pension rights of divorced spouses on the grounds that it would establish a precedent that might be applied to the other services of the Federal Government. In response, Mrs. SCHROEDER herself denied that the Senate provision could be seen as precedent-setting:

While you can say it is a precedent and so forth, it really isn't a precedent, because we are not sending all of those other people abroad. You can work for the civil service and your spouse can have a job in the private sector here, and you're not moved all over the country and you don't have the vesting problems and all of those other problems.

So I think the foreign service is a unique case where this makes sense, with no social security vesting; that also makes sense. And with the divorce rates, we don't want people out forum shopping and playing those games.

But if the gentleman will yield, I think if you look at the map behind us, that is the way we distinguish the foreign service from the other 47 pensions.

Representative FORD. You tell all the wives of the military officers that.

Representative SCHROEDER. Well, I think the gentleman from Michigan can do that. I think he is very competent at drawing lines and understands that there are ways to make differences. And to say that you have to make one law for absolutely everybody because you're absolutely incapable of distinguishing different cases I think short-sells the gentleman from Michigan.

In addition to Mrs. SCHROEDER's own statements, the conferees' intention that the Foreign Service Act not be used as a precedent to justify similar legislation for the military and civil service can be inferred from the Senate and House reports, which repeatedly stressed the unique character of foreign service life, the deprivations imposed on the spouses of Foreign Service officers and the unique service which those spouses render to our Government.

While efforts to extend the special treatment afforded to spouses under the Foreign Service Act will be made and could depend on whether the conferees intended this act to be "precedent-setting," it should at least be made clear for the record that neither the conferees nor the Congress have taken the position that it is.○

## SALMON ENHANCEMENT BILL

○ Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, as a cosponsor of S. 2163, I would like to add my voice to that of my colleagues in the favorable consideration of the salmon enhancement bill.

This legislation, developed through the efforts of Mr. MAGNUSON, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. JACKSON, and myself has been refined to address the critical need for a comprehensive management and enhancement plan for the salmon and steelhead resources of the Pacific Northwest. The measure would reduce the continuing conflicts between Indian and non-Indian fishermen with a minimum of court and Federal involvement and ease the severe economic dislocation of river and ocean fishermen by providing a means for redevelopment of the depleted fisheries of the Columbia.

Therefore, I applaud the Senate's affirmative action clearing this urgently needed legislation.○

## SUPERFUND LEGISLATION

○ Mr. TSONGAS. The purpose of this colloquy is to clarify the intent of an amendment which I offered that was included in the Stafford-Randolph substitute (H. R. 7020) to the "Superfund" legislation.

My amendment makes those carriers currently subject to section 10921 of title 49, United States Code liable for a civil penalty of \$20,000 per violation for

failure to comply with that section. It does not extend the Commission's jurisdiction but merely increases the fine. While the Commission has asserted that authority is necessary to transport hazardous wastes, certain firms are challenging that assertion. The amendment is not intended to prejudge pending litigation nor to preclude the Commission from spelling out its jurisdiction in this area.

Mr. CANNON. That is also my interpretation of the Senator's amendment.○

## DETOXIFYING RADIATION WITH RHETORIC

○ Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, the controversy over the radiation hazard of nuclear power boils down to two issues:

First, whether the nuclear power industry will successfully contain its radioactive poisons; and,

Second, how toxic any radiation they release is.

## THE CONTAINMENT ISSUE

There is little basis for controversy now over whether the nuclear industry will successfully contain its poisons. The Three Mile Island accident, along with hundreds upon hundreds of other radiation spills at nuclear facilities, is ample evidence that promises to perfectly contain the poisons simply are not credible.

The spills today are confirmation of the predictions made by myself and others a decade ago. We realized that the nuclear industry could not be expected to achieve the miraculous levels of containment they promised. In fact, I think the nuclear promoters themselves must have privately agreed that perfect containment would not be achieved, because they have consistently fought to maintain regulations which allow them to release amounts of radiation far in excess of the promised levels.

If the nuclear promoters believed what they were promising, I do not see why they insisted on generous radiation standards. It hardly helps one's credibility to promise one thing, and then scurry about to install laws enabling one to do something entirely different.

## THE TOXICITY ISSUE

No longer able to sell most of the public the idea that no radiation will be released by the nuclear power program, nuclear advocates are now engaging in a massive public relations campaign to "detoxify radiation," despite the fact that all the scientific epidemiological evidence indicates that lowdose radiation is even more toxic than previously thought.

## NO FLAGS SPROUTED

The campaign is aided by two important factors. One is that radiation induced cancer and genetic injuries do not sprout flags announcing their cause.

Hence, nuclear advocates can conveniently mislead the public and Congress by proclaiming:

We do not know a single member of the public who has died or been injured by nuclear power. Do you?

Of course, we do not know, and never will know, which individuals are the

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victims of low-dose radiation because the injuries do not identify themselves. Nevertheless, by studying populations which have been exposed to measured levels of radioactivity scientists can establish the link between radiation and cancer.

The controversy arises over how to interpret the scientific data these studies generate. To understand why there is a controversy today among scientists, it is useful to examine some history.

## THE GOFMAN-TAMPLIN EPISODE

In the early 1960's, considerable public anxiety about the hazards of radiation was generated by the public statements of many scientists including Dr. Barry Commoner, Dr. Linus Pauling, Dr. Ernest Sternglass and numerous others concerning fallout from atom bomb tests.

To satisfy the growing chorus of complaint, the Atomic Energy Commission decided to study the problem. Two eminent scientists, Dr. John Gofman and Dr. Arthur Tamplin, were selected to do the studying. By 1969, they were convinced that the AEC's permissible dose of radiation to the public could result in 16,000 to 32,000 extra cancer deaths in the United States each year. Much to the consternation of the AEC, Gofman and Tamplin made their studies (funded at public expense) public.

A nasty campaign was launched against the two scientists. Attempts were made to censor a speech by Dr. Tamplin at a scientific meeting, his pay was docked and most of his staff was taken away. The scientists were told in a face-to-face meeting with the chairman of the congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy that others had tried to cross the atomic energy establishment and been disposed of; the same thing would happen to them. The President of the National Academy of Sciences made allegations to me about Gofman's scientific credibility which upon investigation turned out to be false. Eventually, both Gofman and Tamplin were forced out of their jobs at the AEC's Livermore Lab.

## THE HARASSMENT CONTINUES . . .

The harassment of scientists who refuse to compromise their scientific principles when they discover troubling information about radiation did not end when Congress voted in 1974 to abolish the AEC. In the mid-1970's, former AEC employees who moved to the Department of Energy arranged to terminate funding for Dr. Thomas Mancuso, who had been commissioned by the AEC to study the health records of nuclear workers. The termination came about after Mancuso refused to join attempts to show that radiation exposure was not causing excess cancer deaths among nuclear workers.

## THE BEIR COMMITTEE

Following testimony from Drs. Gofman and Tamplin to the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution in 1969, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (Robert Finch) sent a letter to Chairman Muskie committed to the establishment of a committee to review radiation standards. That committee, under the National Academy of Sciences, came to be known as the "BEIR Com-

mittee" (BEIR standing for biological effects of ionizing radiation).

Unfortunately, most of the people appointed to the BEIR committee clearly had a conflict-of-interest problem in that they were recipients of AEC grants. Yet they were to review material by Drs. Gofman and Tamplin which had resulted in severe reprisals from that Agency. Loyalty to the AEC, or fear of similar reprisals, meant that even if they tried their best to be completely honest and fair, human nature indicated a conflict of interest problem. I urged the National Academy of Sciences to appoint disinterested scientists to BEIR (for example, without ties to the AEC or nuclear industry), but my efforts were only partially successful.

In 1972, the BEIR Committee published its first report. It indicated that Gofman and Tamplin had overestimated the cancer hazard of radiation by about 5 times. When contrasted with the nuclear promoters' claims that the permissible dose would cause no deaths and injuries to the public, the BEIR report was seen by many as a confirmation of the work of Gofman/Tamplin.

Incidentally, Mr. President, a reason the 1972 BEIR report estimates were lower than Gofman/Tamplin's was that BEIR refused to accept certain evidence Gofman/Tamplin had used concerning the radiation dose to patients who had been irradiated to treat ankylosing spondylitis. In their calculations, Gofman/Tamplin used an estimate of about 62 rads as the dose to the stomach in the patients. Without attributed explanation, BEIR estimated the dose at 250 rads, or possibly 500 rads. Thus, when analyzing radiation-induced cancer deaths among the patients, BEIR was able to arrive at radiotoxicity estimates about four to eight times lower than Gofman/Tamplin.

Interestingly, in a new draft BEIR report in 1979, the estimated dose is down to something between 67 and 89 rads, quite close to the original estimate used by Gofman/Tamplin.

## BEIR III ARRIVES

This year, the BEIR committee issued its third report, known as BEIR III. The report claims that radiation really is not as bad as had been previously estimated. To reach this startling conclusion, which is at odds with all the scientific epidemiological evidence, the BEIR committee had to resort to such ridiculous tactics that the committee chairman, Dr. Edward Radford, has termed the scientific basis for the report "sheer nonsense."

One way the committee arrived at low radiation risk estimates was to simply omit extremely damaging risk assessments for very young people; the committee claimed that such assessments "appeared unreliable." So in their report, they substituted data for older people. Even if the data for young people appeared unreliable, a contention which itself is highly debatable, there can be no justification for inserting data which has no relevance to the issue at hand, and is therefore known to be unreliable.

It is interesting to note that although

the establishment of the entire BEIR process was a result of the work of Gofman/Tamplin, Dr. Gofman has told me he has never received so much as one word of communication from the committee over the past decade.

Mr. President, I request that an article from the July 28, 1980, Seattle Times on the BEIR III report be printed in the RECORD.

The article follows:

## SCIENCE ACADEMY LOWERS ESTIMATES OF RADIATION RISK

(By Mark Bowden)

Amidst continuing dissension within its own ranks, the National Academy of Sciences has reduced its estimate of the health hazards posed by low-level radiation, concluding that such radiation is much less likely to cause cancer and genetic defects than previously reported.

The new estimates, scheduled for public release this month, predict that the health risks are only about one-third as great as earlier agency projections.

The estimates deal with the kind of low-level radiation encountered daily by nuclear-power-plant workers, by the general public in medical X-rays or during such episodes as last year's accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant.

Since the agency's findings form the scientific basis for most federal regulatory guidelines concerning radiation, one academy expert predicts that the new conclusions "will save the nuclear-power and medicine industries in this country millions, perhaps billions of dollars in coming years."

This new position is, in essence, the result of a compromise between feuding factions of the agency's Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation Committee. A special six-member panel of scientists has worked for more than a year to resolve differences between committee members who believe present radiation safety standards are inadequate, and those who argue that the protective standards are excessive.

The compromise has not entirely satisfied either side.

Dr. Edward P. Radford, an epidemiologist at the University of Pittsburgh who is chairman of the radiation committee, charges that the scientific basis for the compromise is "sheer nonsense." Dr. Radford believes radiation safety standards are too lax. He accuses some members of his committee and the special panel of deliberately distorting data in order to find "any justification at all for lowering the risk estimates."

He has written a spirited dissent to what he disdainfully calls "the current version" of his committee's report.

Harald H. Rossi, a physicist at Columbia University who believes weak radiation poses very little health threat, has also written a dissent. He insists that the radiation committee's reworked report overestimates the hazards of low-level exposures by "10 to 30 times the figures I believe are correct."

In three reports over the past eight years (BEIR-1 in 1972, BEIR-2 in 1977 and BEIR-3 in 1979) the committee held that health effects of radiation rise and fall in direct proportion to use. This theory, which is illustrated by a straight-line graph relating dose and response, predicts that any increase in exposure to radiation, no matter how weak the dose, results in an increased incidence of cancer and genetic damage in the exposed population.

BEIR-1 was based primarily on research data from studies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors, and its linear model of radiation-dose response was at odds with conventional biophysical theory. The established theory was of a gradually sloping, or